dicates that this text has a metaphysical basic structure, whereby an analysis of this text becomes necessary. However, the exact chronological determination of Hägerström’s anti-subjectivism is of minor importance to this study. Konrad Marc-Wogau’s description of Hägerström’s development from idealism to anti-subjectivism is concentrated in an analysis of Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft and Selbstdarstellungen. To begin, there are several differences between the ideas of Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft and those of Selbstdarstellungen.179 The first difference concerns the concept of reality and Hägerström’s use of that concept.180 In Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft Hägerström held that the concepts “being” or “reality” were correlative to the concept “selfidentity”,181 presupposing one another for their respective proper meanings, just as the concepts “father” and “son” presuppose one another for their respective meanings. However, twenty years later (1929)Hägerströmheld that“reality”and“self-identity”were identical rather than correlative.182 Hägerström’s new opinion indicated that his philosophy had taken a definite turn from idealism towards a more coherent antimetaphysical standpoint.The effects of this turn are accentuated a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 91 3. 3. 1 “real i ty” and “se lf- ident i ty” 179 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 55, 57, 60, and 62. 180 Ibid., p. 55. 181 Ibid., pp. 55-56; Hägerström, P. d.W., pp. 87-129; Selbstdarstellungen, p. 18. If Hägerström’s use of the concept correlative is used in its statistical meaning then the following can be inferred: If “being” and “self-identity” are correlative (in the statistical meaning) then Hägerström’s standpoint in Das Prinzip derWissenschaft indicates that the relationships between these concepts are of a non-necessary nature, a relationship merely indicating the existence of a strong statistical correlation between “being” and “reality”, and “self-identity”, on the assumption that the concept correlative is understood in the ordinary manner.This would consequently mean that if something had reality/being then this thing would probably be self-identical, but not necessarily, and vice versa. Reality/being will in such a case just be an indicator of self-identity of variable strength and vice versa. But if being/reality and self-identity are identical then they are in a necessary relationship with one another rather than being in a contingent relationship to one another. 182 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 55-56.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=