unwarranted with respect to object-oriented, empirical sciences such as physics and history, which function positively. Hägerström’s view of the nature of objective knowledge necessitates that science is bound by a demand for objective, material correspondence between subject and object in its factual judgments and formal certainty, and coherence in its logical judgments.120 The scientific truths emanating from this version of objectivity (objectivism) must thus show the existence of a definite, non-contradictory, and real relationship between (subjective) theories, and (objective) facts in order to be validated and verified.121 Free, albeit logical, thinking is thus not a sufficient condition for the proper verification of true propositions.122 True propositions must demonstrate more than formal consistency; they must in fact demonstrate the existence of an unequivocal correspondence between the subject’s judgment and the designated features of the object of that same judgment, a connection that cannot merely be imagined.123 In other words, what is necessary for the existence of true knowledge is a connection a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 73 2 . 7 corre spondence and cohe rence : the nature of obj ect ive knowledge 120 This is a view that hardly can be said to correspond to Bjarup’s analysis that Hägerström argues that there:“are only principles of necessary truths”; and that:“Hägerström’s conception of judgment leads to the rationalist model of geometry as the ideal form of knowledge.” Bjarup, Reason, p. 116. 121 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 5-9; “Hägerström.” Cf. Hägerström, P. d.W., pp. 68-72. 122 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 7-9. 123 Hägerström, P. d.W., p. 23;“Hägerström.”; Selbstdarstellungen, p. 16. However Bjarup argues that Hägerström rejected the so-called correspondence theory of truth in favour for the so-called coherence theory of truth. Bjarup, Reason, pp. 270-277.While other writers, Marc-Wogau and Bo Petersson classify Hägerström’s truth theory as a correspondence theory of truth. Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 91 and 182-183; Petersson,Värdeteori, pp. 50-51 and 74-75.What Bjarup bases his conclusion upon appears to be a regrettable confusion of epistemology and ontology as Hägerström speaks of things, while Bjarup speaks of knowledge.The ontological characteristics of things determine whether or not they are accessible to the epistemological subject, but such characteristics do not imply that true knowledge is founded upon a coherence theory of truth.