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tive act, rather than synthetic knowledge solely shaped by the qualities of the epistemological subject.A further difference between the epistemologies of Kant and Hägerström is that Hägerström sought to establishobjective synthetic knowledge, while Kant wished to establish apodictic synthetic knowledge.The difference might appear to be slight at first glance, but the consequences are far-reaching, because the former type of knowledge is primarily object dependent and relative, while the latter type of knowledge is primarily subject dependent (due to its apodictic character) and ostensibly absolute.118 This is Hägerström’s scientific world picture: Therefore, while Kant’s subjectivism was warranted with respect to formal sciences such as logic, which function negatively, it was p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 2 72 118 For a different view, see Bjarup, Reason, p. 116 and 122. Bjarup reads Hägerström as if he were a metaphysical essentialist believing in the possibility of transcendental cognition in the form of absolutely secure empirical knowledge (essential knowledge). Bjarup, “Epistemology and Law according to Axel Hägerström,” in Scandinavian Studies in Law, 29, pp. 26-82. Bjarup’s reading contradicts what Bo Petersson writes about Hägerström’s “vetenskapliga världsbild” (scientific world-picture) according to which scientific knowledge incessantly reformulates itself and develops under the pressure of added information and new theoretical models, whereby the human context of experience, by means of exact observation and induction, are made to correspond with reality. Petersson, Axel Hägerströms värdeteori (Axel Hägerström’s theory of value), pp. 24-25. Compare Petersson’s analysis with Bjarup’s analysis, which describes Hägerström’s philosophy as solipsistic and arrogant. Bjarup, Reason, pp. 270277. According to Bjarup’s analysis: “Hägerström’s scientific world-picture is based upon thinking, but this view leaves no room for observations of what actually happens, or for predictions of future events” (p. 276) and:“Hägerström’s scientific worldpicture implies an omniscient and infallible being, and this given, it follows that any judgment he makes is true.The final objection to this view is that Hägerström is a man, and all men are fallible.” (p. 277). 119 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 23. “Daß das wissenschaftliche Weltbild im Verhältnis zu dem unwissenschaftlichen das wahre ist, bedeutet nur, daß das erstere das letztere mit Rücksicht auf neue Bewußtseinsinhalte als ein bloßes Glied in einem umfassenderen Zusammenhang bestimmt. Keineswegs wird damit das letztere nichtig. Nur die metaphysische ‘Weltauffassung’ muß bei Beachtung des ihr zugrundeliegenden Komplexes von Gefühlen undVorstellungen als nichtig bestimmt werden,weil man bei ihr, getrieben von diesem Komplex, Wortzusammenstellungen ohne Sinn bildet und doch glaubt, die Worte hätten einen Sinn.”119