of the concepts (especially not in “Botanisten ochfilosofen”), which makes the possibility of conceptual realism a problem that must be addressed in full.67 Because if there is no difference between “existence” and “reality”, then the theory of universals is realism, and all that is needed for autonomous conceptual existence, in the Aristotelian meaning, is reality in Hägerström’s formalistic meaning.Therefore, if a concept is non-contradictory, then it exists (independently of subjective machinations). Consider, for example, that Hägerström construes the reality of the concept as based upon the determinate character of the thing in question, and the conceptual consciousness finds logical support in the reality of the object, its determinateness. In addition, the perceived objects are, so to say, determined by means of the concepts insofar as the perceiving subject discerns amongst objects by means of various concepts (derived from an analysis of objects).68 In all, there exists a close relationship between object and concept in “Botanisten och filosofen”. The reality, non-contradictoriness of the concept can thus be deduced from the object’s own determinateness, so accordingly there exists a relationship between the concept and its members and vice versa, but it is through the concept that the object gains determinateness. In other words, it is through the concepts that the perceiving subject can distinguish physical objects from one another. It is thus safe to conclude that “Botanisten och filosofen” makes an implicit distinction between the objective determinateness of a concept and the concept’s subjective determinateness. The two forms of determinateness are apparently not identical to one another, even though they are closely related to one another (just as the principle of identity and the law of contradictions are not identical to one another, but logically related to one another). a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 189 67 Martin Fries, in ibid., pp. 107, n, see 253-254. 68 Ibid., p. 82.