thoughts.337 In any case epistemological metaphysics, as Hägerström defines it, does not provide the necessary (epistemological) correspondence between subject and object that is needed for a tenable conception of knowledge. According to Hägerström, metaphysical philosophy has one basic fault: It does not maintain a clear and distinct separation between epistemology and ontology. This is the specific act of omission that is the real root of the inconsistencies and invalidity of philosophical idealism and realism - subjectivism.The problems caused by the absence of a distinction between them are in turn only possible to solve if one analyses or investigates propositions (epistemology) and reality as such (ontology) separately, something that had not been done in idealism and realism.338 According to Hägerström’s line of argumentation any uncertainty or obscurity referring to the relationship between epistemology and ontology will yield the result that knowledge and its object have an illogical relationship to one another.This is characterized by the fact that in order to express true knowledge, knowledge and its supposed object are held to be simultaneously identical and non-identical, hence knowledge and object according to subjectivism simultaneously is knowledge and nonknowledge; object and non-object; that which is knownand that which is not known; or that which is a thing and that which is not a thing, and so forth, all depending upon whether you take the epistemological or the ontological view. Hence, subjectivism postulates an epistemological relationship between subject and object that in order to be valid must violate the law of the excluded third, accordingly the cognitive relationship of subjectivism neither expresses knowledge nor anything real. In metaphysical ontology reality is defined as being something other than physical reality, something that is more real than spatio-temporal reality. In addition to this, a certain aspect of realip a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 6 150 337 Ibid., pp. 4-6 and 33-34. 338 Ibid., p. 7.
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