RB 65

ty or a certain thing is identified as being identical with reality in itself, whereby everything else must be considered as being relatively lacking in reality.339 Any division into different degrees of reality, which implies that some things are absolutely real while other things are relatively real, will lead to the absurd notion that any degree of diminished reality must be something real in itself, although only absolute reality can be real.340 What is problematic is hence the fact that any division of reality into different parts or categories will bring about confusion in epistemology as well as ontology, as the law of contradictions according to Hägerström is more than a law of thought, and is in fact the definition of reality.341 By its nature reality is non-contradictory, not contradictory, which is the case if reality is construed as being ontologically divisible into different sets of being or different degrees of reality, in the manner of ontological metaphysics. Metaphysical efforts to overcome this division of reality will, instead of eradicating these contradictions, lead to more of them rather than fewer.342 According to Hägerström’s philosophy, subjectivism is ontological metaphysics transported to the realm of epistemology, whereby physical reality is explained by reference to a super-sensible reality, which is held to be causally prior to the former.343 There exist two main forms of subjectivism, idealism and realism that traditionally have been contrasted with one another: a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 151 “Seitdem der menschliche Geist seine ersten unsicherenVersuche machte, das Wesen des Wirklichen zu begreifen, stehen in heisser Kampfeslust zwei philosophische Grundrichtungen einander gegenüber: die rationalistische und die empiristische. Aus dem rationalistischen Lager erschallt die Losung: Die Sinne trügen. Eine höhere Norm für die Erkenntnis ist notwendig: das Denken, letzthin der Begriff von der Selbstidentität derWirklichkeit. Sogar die allgemeine Realität der Sinnesan339 Ibid., pp. 26-27; Hägerström,“Hägerström.”;“The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 340 Fries, “Grunddragen i Axel Hägerströms filosofi,” in Socialfilosfiska uppsatser, p. 14. 341 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 9-10. 342 Cf. Hägerström, “Kraftvorstellungen,” pp. 75-76. 343 Fries, “Grunddragen i Axel Hägerströms filosofi,” pp. 9-13.