Since Hägerström attributes the concepts with objectivity MarcWogau argues the theory amounts to conceptual realism. Concepts are not only part of reality as features immanent in the mind’s content, but also have independent existence by virtue of being determinations of real objects and things.333 One must remember that according to Hägerström’s notion of concepts, real concepts neither exist in the Platonic sense nor in the Aristotelian sense of metaphysical existence.334 The Platonic or the Aristotelian notion of concepts contradicts Hägerström’s philosophy, which does not allow the establishment of absolute synthetic knowledge in the metaphysical sense of the word. In Hägerström’s philosophy even the most universal inductive determination must be open for revision if new observations indicate that prior inductive concepts are in need of revision. It is no surprise that Hägerström, who regarded idealism and realism as twin forms of metaphysics, so-called subjectivism, which both resulted in philosophical nihilism, concluded that “praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam”335, and used this as his philosophical motto.336 In epistemology, the problem could be stated as follows: neither idealistic nor realistic epistemology can give a proper account of how it is possible to acquire knowledge that includes both a subjective as well as an objective component. Epistemological idealism, on the one hand, cannot explain in what respect or how, our thoughts can entail knowledge of an outside world, while epistemological realism, on the other, cannot explain how objective knowledge can become part of our a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 149 6 . 2 . 1 häge r ström’s conce ptual real i sm 333 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 116-120. 334 Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 230-232. 335 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 48. 336 Cf. ibid., pp. 2-3, 5-7, 20-21, and 33-34. 6 . 3 conclus ion: cri t ique of metaphys ical phi losophy
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