What poses a problem for Hägerström’s early theory (1908) is that if a concept is determined by its correlate, then it is logically possible that several concepts may correlate to this very concept rather than only one (save diametrical opposites, such as, for example “black” and “white”, where there are only two possible alternatives). If we have a set of correlative concepts that are delimited or defined by one another, then this correlative relationship does not necessarily preclude the possibility that several other concepts may have a correlative relationship to any one of the given concepts.186 Furthermore, if a concept can correlate to several other concepts, then the relationship between the various concepts is relative rather than absolute and all-excluding (the latter being the specific type of ontological relationship between reality and self-identity that Hägerström wished to establish). If this is the case, then, from the concept’s point of view, the relationship is externally determined rather than internally, conceptually determined, and hence the relationship is neither necessary nor absolute. Hence, the postulated correlative relationship between reality and self-identity reveals that this relationship is neither necessary nor exclusive.This is due to the fact that concept reality is possible to postulate as having correlative relationships to any number of concepts without any ensuing contradictions,while, on the other hand, self-identity is a concept that is impossible to postulate as correlative to any concept other than non-self-identity, which is its diametrical opposite.187 Provided that this is the case, a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 93 186 For instance, the correlative concepts “father” and “son” are correlative to several other concepts rather than just to one another, such as: “father” and “daughter”, “mother” and “son”,“parents” and “son”,“father” and “children”,“father” and “siblings” and so on. 187 Actually if Hägerström, in Selbstdarstellungen, is right in asserting that metaphysics is any philosophical standpoint that identifies reality with any specific real thing, then the number of possible correlates to reality is endless; for in such case it is possible that reality correlates to any given concept or thing since all things could posses that quality which entails reality.This therefore reveals inherent weaknesses in the ontological theory of Das Prinzip derWissenschaft and supports Konrad Marc-Wogau’s thesis that Hägerström’s philosophy underwent a substantial change between 1908 and
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