ject, a concept, or an assertion with any logical certainty is identical with itself?47 Thus, Hägerström’s conclusion is that subjectivism has only two alternative solutions.An analysis of the problem reveals that neither solution is a palatable alternative.The first alternative implies resorting to contradictions, and is thus unacceptable.48The second alternative involves a non-subjectivistic, namely objectivistic, reformulation of the basic principles of subjective rationalism, and is thus equally unacceptable to subjective rationalism.The problem, which transcendental philosophy must solve, is how objective knowledge can be established in a non-contradictory manner consistent with Kant’s own subjectivistic principles of epistemology. What Hägerström’s analysis implies is that the problem afflicting Kant’s philosophy is Kant’s consistent failure to apply his critique without prejudice, thus failing to test the fundamentals of his own philosophy for structural weaknesses.49 Had Kant performed this critical test on his own premisses it might have forced him to reformulate his philosophy in a slightly less subjectivistic direction. Hägerström’s early attempts to solve the problems connected to the conception of objective knowledge started from a Kantian basis. He ascribes this to the fact that he was once enraptured by: “die Theorie der Einheit der Selbstbewußtseins als der letzten Grundes der Objektivität desWissens”,50 which in effect meant that Hägerström originally ascribed to Kant’s subjectivistic solution to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge as being final. The underlying premiss for Hägerström’s acceptance of Kant’s epistemological subjectivism was to be found in that specific truth that Hägerström at the time regarded as being selfevident.This was: a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 49 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Hägerström, Om den moraliska känslan och driften såsom förnuftiga i den moderna rationalismens huvudformer, Förord. 50 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 1.