RB 65

true; and b) have a definitive decided reality.392 This observation is a corollary to the correspondence theory of truth in its nonmetaphysical form, which according to Hägerström demands that true propositions about reality contain objective parts as well as subjective elements,393 of which the former guarantees material correspondence, while the latter formal validity. The demand that true propositions about reality must be made up of subjective as well as objective elements, must thus be satisfied in some manner, which is only possible if one assumes that both object and subject share at least one common property - logical consistency. Furthermore, Hägerström’s epistemology is aimed at uncovering that which is possible to know, never that which is beyond the grasp of our minds in the form of essential knowledge.394 On the contrary, he argues that scientific knowledge is actually subject to constant change over the course of time and that it is only that specific “scientific world-picture” that gives the most consistent picture of the world at a specific point in time that actually provides the truest and most objective account of our world.395 In a purely philosophical account, the realistic label given to Hägerström is therefore in definite contradiction to the corollaries of his theory of knowledge and reality, namely that true and real knowledge comprises objective as well as subjective elements (albeit that Hägerström emphasizes the objective elements). In Hägerström’s ontology, reality constitutes a single logically noncontradictory context implying that it is ontologically self-identical (which constitutes a stark contradiction to traditional metaphysical ontology according to which reality is hierarchically stratified, with several of its levels, ranging from the concrete a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 165 392 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 4-5. 393 Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 89-90. 394 Hägerström, “Filosofien som vetenskap,” pp. 7-8. 395 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 22-24; Petersson, Värdeteori, pp. 24-25. 7. 5 ontology: the nature of real i ty