According to Nordin, the difference between his and MarcWogau’s estimates of when Hägerström initiated his anti-subjectivism relates to Nordin’s and Marc-Wogau’s respective interpretations of subjectivismand idealism. For while Nordin draws a distinction between subjectivism and idealism Marc-Wogau fails to do so, which according to Nordin means that Marc-Wogau’s interpretation of Hägerström’s anti-subjectivism necessarily must take an anti-idealistic and thus realistic turn,360 which is an error on the part of Konrad Marc-Wogau. Nordin is of the opinion that it is possible to make a distinction in this aspect allowing not only an anti-subjectivistic but also an idealistic interpretation of the so-called anti-subjectivism of Hägerström’s early career.361 According to my interpretation, one must take into consideration that Hägerström himself saw few or no practical differences between epistemological idealism and realism.362 If the two are subjected to a critical philosophical analysis then it can be demonstrated that neither idealism nor realism are able to convey any real knowledge of reality (and the objects therein) to the subject.363 Once analyzed, idealism reveals itself as nothing less thansolipsismwhile realism amounts to epistemological nihilism.364 What unites the two doctrines is that in both cases no connection between the epistemological subject and the object of cognition can be established, hence neither doctrine can formulate tenable knowledge about objects.365 So what we are left with, aca ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 157 360 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 361 Ibid. 362 E.g., Hägerström, Om filosofiens betydelse för människan, pp. 25-27. Here Hägerström gives a brief account of the different types of philosophical systems that are possible: Rationalistic systems, empiricistic systems, idealistic systems, realistic systems, subjectivistic systems and objectivistic systems. See also what Hägerström writes about subjectivism - idealism and realism, solipsism and nihilism, and finally sensualism - in: Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 1-9 and 26-49; “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 208-230. See also Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 52-57. 363 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 6-7, 21, 29, and 33-34. 364 N.B. Hägerström never fails to see the subject as a possible object for knowledge, which will explain why even solipsism must entail the notion of an object, which means that there cannot exist any real solipsism, only ostensible forms of solipsism. Cf. Hägerström, “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 222-224 and 229-230. 365 Cf. ibid.