possible. Furthermore, according to the sensualistic view, concepts are neither constructed abstractions (based upon empirical data) nor empirical data (since the concepts in themselves are not empirically given). Concepts are merely denominations, designations, or terms for specific instances of sensory-data,354 whereby the misgiving arises that objective knowledge and science is impossible. Sensualism can thus be compared with nominalism when it comes to the objective foundation to the determination of knowledge and concepts. If one follows Marc-Wogau’s line of reasoning, then the conclusion is that Hägerström initiated an anti-subjectivistic research program inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft (1908),which was not carried to completion until much later.355 Svante Nordin is of another opinion. He traces Hägerström’s anti-subjectivistic disposition back to 1898 when Hägerström wrote Om filosofiens betydelse för människan,356 which is followed by his anti-subjectivistic interpretation of Kant’s philosophy in the monograph Kants Ethik imVerhältnis zu seinen Erkenntnistheoretische Grundgedanken (1902).357 According to Nordin, Hägerström also used this antisubjectivistic interpretation of Kant as his primary premiss in the philosophical investigation of law inStat och rätt (1904).358 Nordin’s interpretation of Hägerström’s philosophical production up until Das Prinzip derWissenschaft is that Hägerström during this period embraced an anti-subjectivistic epistemology that nevertheless was still distinctly idealistic.359 p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 6 156 6 . 5 ant i -subj ect ivi sm or obj ect ivi sm: summary and conclus ions 354 Hägerström, “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 226-230. See also Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 33-34. 355 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 80-81. 356 Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, p. 33. 357 Ibid., pp. 34-35. See also Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. iii-v; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 5-7. N.B. In the latter two texts, Hägerström does not describe his interpretation of Kant’s philosophy in Kants Ethik as “anti-subjectivistic”, he calls it non-psychological. 358 Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, pp. 34-35. See also Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. iii-v. 359 Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, p. 35.