RB 54

122 The safeguards, then, are given by “the nature and the experience of all times and peoples.” This theory of proof is “morenegative than positive”; it does not intend to convert the judge into a “blind automaton,” but to ensure that the judge “nicht auf Phantasiefliigeln iiber das Reich der Wahrheit hinausflattere und ein Volkenbild mit innigster ueberzeugung statt der Wahrheit umarme.”'*^ Although rejecting the jury both for reasons relating to evidential theories and because of their being unsuitable for a constitutional monarchy, the spokesmen for the negative theory of proof see other possibilities of bourgeois control. For them, publicity and orality are indispensable qualities of a good procedural system, and it is through these principles, not the jury, that public (bourgeois) control is to be assured. First, the necessity of orality is clearly connected to the element of free evaluation in the negative theory of evidence. To forma personal conviction, written procedure does not suffice for Feuerbach: “Die Mine des Beschuldigten oder der Zeugen, ihr Ton, ihre Haltung, ihr Betragen sagen oft mehr ... als der Inhalt der Rede selbst ... Ein Protocoll bleibt immer nur eine Copie der wirklichen Behandlung und kann unmöglich alle Ziigc in ihrer ursprunglichen Wahrheit wiedergeben.”-° Second, publicity is connected to the orality. The two ought not, however, to be exaggerated, but need to be reasonably balanced. To ensure efficient proceedings, the Vorverfahren ought to rely on written forms and secrecy; the Hauptverfahren, on the contrary, should be based on the principles of orality and publicity.-* For Zachariä, the principles of publicity, orality, and immediacy belong unseparably to the accusatory Hauptverfahren. These principles were less appropriate for the inquisitorial Vorverfahren The main features of Feuerbach and Zachariä’s theory can, thus, be sumniarized in two points. First, theirs is a full-fledged negative theory of proof. It deems the legal theory of proof necessary, for not all sources of knowledge are equally trustworthy. These rules are not sufficient, however, for the judge has to be morally convinced of the accused’s guilt. Second, they reject criminal trial juries and prefer professional judges, for laymen belong to a republican form of government and not a constitutional monarchy. The first feature, the particular formulation of the evidentiary theory, can conveniently be portrayed as a transitory stage between the legal thec^ry of proof and the free evaluation of evidence. In it, old and new elements are present: old, because of the presence of the absolutist state, against the arbiFeuerbach 1813 pp. 132-133; von Steinann 1847 pp. 263-264. 2C Feuerbach 1813 p. 30. Feuerbach 1825 pp. 295, 300, 313. -- Zachariä 1846 pp. 52, 60-61, 72-83, 259. For Zachariä, an accusatory procedure, due to the judiciary’s more passive role as compared to the inquisitorial procedure, was necessarily more formal. Therefore, evaluation of evidence also had to be bound by rules.

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