123 trariness of which the bourgeoisie needs to protect itself with the help of the rules of proof; new, for a nascent emphasis on the “moral” persuasion of the judge. In this respect, no essential change had taken place when the concepts of Filangieri, Feuerbach, and Zachariä are compared. The Legal Profession and Liberalism At the end of the eighteenth century, the German legal profession had gone through significant changes. The legal system, alongside the administration and educational system, had begun to be systematized. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a newer stratum of development was added to the older one: a development caused by the rise of free enterprise, ideas of social contract, and a civil society in a constitutional and parliamentary system. Typically, a German territorial state became a Beamtenstaat, in the bureaucracy of which the legal profession played a central role. As opposition to absolutism rose from the 1780s onwards, state officials came to identify themselves as Staatsdiener instead of Fiirstendiener. These tendencies generated new societal groups and professions, and legal professionals came to act as an important group of mediators in this social power system.-^ In legal ideology, the rise of the legal profession was reflected in the success of the Historical School of law and its efforts to represent the legal corps as the adequate representative of the German Volk. Accurately, Whitman has depicted Friedrich Carl von Savigny and the Historical School of Lawas a “backward-looking reform movement” in the time of German romanticism. In Savigny’s time, there was a return to the long-lost professorial power in law through the so-called Aktenversendung, an institution which had practically fallen into oblivion in the sixteenth century: in the first decades of the 1800s, the Spruchkollegien flourished again. The Savignyan Romanists saw themselves - the German lawyers and law professors - as reborn representatives of Antiquity.-'* As far as the lawof proof was concerned, the critical choice in the post-Napoleonic era was no longer between the legal theory of proof or the free evaluation of proof. The essential question was formulated differently: Was the free evaluation of proof now to be exercised by the legal corps dominated by the professors, their Spruchkollegien and their “Juristenrecht” — with the actual courts still being bound by the legal rules of proof — or were independent courts presided over by legal experts and manned by lay jurors to be established? Roughly, the Romanistic wing of the Historical School represented the first alternative, whereas the post-1848 triumphant second alternative was Hattcnhaucr 1980 pp. 205-207, 249; Whitman 1990 pp. 66-75, 100; Siegfrist 1991 p. 47; also Konttinen 1991. Whitman 1990 pp. 99-102, 108-109. Cf. Dawson 1968 pp. 202-205. sec
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