In the case of Laufs, it could he helpful to return to the definition of naturalism in the Radhruch quote above (cited with appro\ al in Laufs) and ask to what extent Laufs constructs the image of an "uhergesetzliches Recht, an dem gemessen das Unrecht Unrecht hleiht, auch wenn es in die I'orm des (iesetzes gegossen ist"? Such an image can either he suggested through moral o\ertones, direct reference to a higher law or a combination of both. A look at Laufs' normati\ e language is helpful as there are some clear moral o\ ertones. Important to note in this regard is his focus on how the Recht rather than someone's neighbour was abused and how such abuse resulted in an L inrcht. Lhe word Lnrecht is consistenth’ used in his text and the opening sentence on the chapter on the Pi-f-'ersioi/ dcs Reebts the tone; "Die \ erkehrung.. .xon Recht in Unrecht.. .verwirklichte sich in den jahren 19^;; bis 194c auf unerhörte Weise" (^70). (See also e.g. I'urther, he writes that 1 litler and his Ptirtcijuristai "millachtctni this Rccbt” (371, italics mine), but adds that against such treatment of the law, "standen einige wenige gegeniiber, in denen rechtstreue und mutige Richter sich bewiihrten" italics mine), lie also mentions WiderstmuLurebt, which a realist would be wont to label a contradiction in terms, and speaks of this natural law as were it somehow logical Lhen there is the Hhcrgcsctzlicbcs Rccbt. I'or the application of 117dcr.<:t(indsrccbt, Laufs cites a decision by the Bundesgerichtshof in 1961, where the iudges claim the act of civil disobedience to be in accordance with law "im Sinne einer Offenharmachung und \erwirklicluing dc.^ -I'iibyoi Rccbt.T" italics mine). Laufs' concluding remark on this B(jl 1-decision suggests that he sees this attempted application of natural law as not onlv possible but also as a fact: "Das Naturrecht, auf da.^ dcr Biuidc.ugcricbt.djof aueb .wu.^r gclcgoitlicb zuriickgriffl erscheint bier als letzlich tragende (irund des W'iderstandes 27
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