sense of the word can be categorized Swedish followers of the Historical School; second, the Uppsala School. Both schools answer the question affirmatively. According to Nordling, et al., the propositions of legal science are valid principles of law when they correspond to the general consciousness of the law – that is, either or both constitute an extract or the essence of the general consciousness of law and contain precepts deducted from such consciousness, thus making legal science practical. The Uppsala School, on the other hand, restricts the criteria of correspondence to the technical sources of law, but if legal science aspires to have any practical relevance to the judge and thus guide him in his duty, then it must not only correspond to the technical sources of law, but also formulate principles that correspond to reality - that is, the law in totality, social reality, the aims and objectives of the law, and the spirit of the law,59 and by such means become beneficial to the welfare of society. Provided that this is the case, it is relevant to question whether or not there exists any practical difference between the above-mentioned doctrines of legal science.Hägerström’s view, and that of several others, can be summarized as representing the idea that jurisprudence must take into account various social demands. For instance, to take into consideration (among other things) the value of a legal order that is consistently and uniformly applied, but at the same time open to arguments that allow jurists to adapt formal legal consistency to the material needs of the specific society for which the legal order itself exists. In that respect, Lundstedt is even more explicit in his desire to abolish the so-called method of justice in preference for his method of social utility (samhällsnyttemetoden). Furthermore, if one analyses this idea of the Uppsala School and its doctrine of sources,a remarkable degree of similarity to jurisprudential tradition and custom appears. It then becomes relevant to ask whether the “consciousness of law” that the followers of the Historical School of jurisprudence use as the substrate or substance of law in effect has a function different from that of the Uppsala School’s use of social aspects – expressed by means of “social evaluations” – as forming the ultimate end of the legal order, the law and its application. Do these concepts serve different theoremax ly l e s 175 59 E. g. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 21; Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-88.
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