on how he theoretically could or should act in order to fulfill the aims and objectives of the law while simultaneously complying with the demands of the public made on judges in the execution of their duty as public officials.The theoretical knowledge of law thus provided by jurisprudence is analogous to the legislature’s knowledge and familiarity with society (which in a loose sense can be described as theoretical knowledge).56 Hägerström continues along the same avenue, arguing that since the academic lawyer and the judge must both comply with the social aims laid down by the legislator when interpreting and applying statutes, then their knowledge of society must coincide rather than diverge. For while the judge complies with the aims of the legislator on account of his duty as a judge, the academic complies through his sense of duty in relation to the judge - that is, his aspirations to facilitate the judge’s official duties. Hence, if the academic’s texts are to have any legal relevance to the judge, and thereby constitute a source of law, then the academic lawyer must apply a constructive method and allow the academic analysis and exposition to be conducted with a practical aim in mind, which is the simple determination of the extent to which the application of a specific coercive measure, as prescribed by positive law, can be regarded as being legal.The reasons may differ, but the effects will converge.Therefore, the positive tasks of judges and legal scholars are to determine whether or not a decision to apply force is legally conclusive in respect to the specific rules of law as well as the aims and objectives of those same rules.And by bringing the tasks of judges and legal scientists together, Hägerström implied that the ultimate aim of legal science was practical, rather than being purely theoretical, purely descriptive.This means that legal science must thus open itself up to realistic argument, as well as to legally acknowledged arguments. For example, the demands of trade, social production and general welfare and safety - in short, the good of society.58 The main question addressed in this paper was whether or not legal science is a source of law? The answer to this question is provided by reference to two schools of jurisprudence: First, those that in a wide re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 174 56 Ibid.: pp. 87-88. 57 Cf. ibid.: p. 88. 58 Ibid.: p. 86. 4 . summary and conc lu s i on s
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