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Lars Niléhn 60 Interests of state, however, more than natural law was the principle behind the historical writings of Pufendorf. Moreover, this may be regarded as much as a sign of his impartial way of writing as of the opposite. If one examines Pufendorf’s own statements in this question, one cannot find that he considered that a contradiction existed between his duty as a historian and his official commission. Nevertheless, he does confess that he employs moderation toward Brandenburg in his later works.®^ Meinecke thinks that Pufendorf by and large fulfilled his task without reproach. He was conscious of the basic problem, he subdued his feelings, and he did not make any judgments.^® Actually, this way of writing history based on interests of state may be regarded on the same level as natural science.^^ Then it is possible to put it beside his theory of law, which, analogous to previous ways of regarding jurisprudence, has been called mos geometricus.^^ It is one step further than usus modernus, as this had been formulated by, among others, Herman Conring, whose historical criticism influenced Pufendorf.^^ The whole theory of natural law was regarded as a parallel to the new natural science.'*” It is also possible to see attempts to reform state administration, as in France, for example, as a parallel way of thinking.^* From this point of view, the impartiality of Pufendorf as a historian must be seen as perfect. Leonard Krieger starts from a similar statement by Pufendorf, that the historian shall serve his principal as well as be objective. He was not aware of the contradiction in this, but he was aware of the problem. The solution was to be found in the interest of the state. Here the two duties of the historian was united, since both he and the historico-political agent were impersonal. This did not give any absolute truth, however. Historical knowledge served certain purposes and in actual texts this could show in the selection of data.*- Krieger’s starting point is thus similar to that of Meinecke, but his conelusion is different. Obviously there was a marked difference between the two tasks of the historian and Pufendorf was not able to bridge the gap. Nevertheless, a truth existed beyond the political situation of the day and this was to be found in natural law. But despite the fact that a judgment “ Pufendorf in a letter to Paul von Fuchs, Jan. 19th, 1688, printed in Historische Zeitschrift 70(1893), p 28. Meinecke p 294 ff. ” ibid, p 296. Denzer p 282 f. Krieger p 159, 180 Hammerstcin 1977 p 190. Lindberg p 19 ff. James E. King, Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis XIV 1661— 1683, Baltimore 1949. Krieger s 193 f. 38

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