RS 12

Thomas Mautner 126 the general good, we say that any person in such circumstances has a right to do, possess, or demand that thing. And according as this tendency to the publick good is greater or less, the right is greater or less.^^ Whatever one possesses or enjoys so that disturbance or interruption by others would be deemed wrong, we say ‘tis his right or that he has a right to enjoy or possess it. On a demand, noncompliance with which would be wrong, we say that one has a right to what is thus demanded. Or more briefly: a man hath a right to do, possess, or demand any thing, when his acting possessing or obtaining from another in these circumstances tends to the good of society, and obstructing him would have the contrary tendency The ultimate notion of right is that which tends to the universal good; and when one’s acting in a certain manner has this tendency, he has a right thus to act.-® Related concepts in Pufendorf are also reinterpreted. Take for instance the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. It is coextensive with the distinction between justice and other branches of morality. Adichotomy is signified. In Hutcheson, the account is less clear, because there enters a tendency to regard the alleged greater importance of perfect rights as their defining property; the rights more important for the preservation of social life may be maintained even by violence. So the tendency is to make the difference one of degree. The fact is also overlooked that perhaps some very important things do not admit of being maintained through coercion.-' The doctrine of natural equality is also reinterpreted. Hutcheson proposes that it is best that men regard each other as equal, since claims to superiority by some, however well-founded (e.g. on grounds of superior wisdom), will be disputed by others so that conflicts will ensue.-® Rejection of all such claims will better preserve harmony. This is of course a utilitarian approach, quite different from the tradition according to which claims to superiority by some over others could not be well-founded unless the subordination was based on prior consent (or, of course, generation or injury). It would appear, then, that Hutcheson has no genuine rights theory in his natural jurisprudence. The distinctive feature of the modern natural law tradition is missing. What he offers is in effect a utilitarian theory disguised as natural jurisprudence. As a result, confusions arise. This can be seen, for instance, in Reid. On the one hand, a theory of rights is taken to be different from a theory of Hutcheson (1725) 2, 7, 4; later eds. 2, 7, 6. Hutcheson (1755) 2, 3, 1, slightly condensed. 26 Hutcheson (1755) 2, 3, 7. Hutcheson (1725) 2, 7, 4; later eds. 2, 7, 6. Similarly Carmichael Suppl. II, xiv; on this point he seems to have anticipated Hutcheson. 26 Hutcheson (1755) 2, 5, 3.

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=