PUFENDORF AND 18TH-CENTURY SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 123 freely and licitly known prior to any law^^—a right which he also describes as man’s natural prerogative to lead the life of a sovereign monarch —he notes that this is no invention of his, and mentions Grotius and a few others. The easiest way to form an idea of this distinctive conception in the theories of Grotius and Pufendorf is by considering our contemporary conception of sovereignty as an attribute of individual entities in international law and politics. What applies to these sovereign entities also applies, mutatis mutandis, to individuals in the state of nature. Indeed, it was on the basis of this parallel that Grotius designed his treatise. The individual has by nature a realm of his own, of that which by nature belongs to him, his suum. This concept is too primitive to admit of an ordinary definition. It is more easily felt than articulated. We know, however, what things are naturally our own, what is included in this realm. According to Pufendorf, the innate constituents of the suumare, equally for every human being, one’s life, the body and its parts, one’s reputation, honour and sexual integrity, andone’s actions. So also inGrotius.Thenatural freedom makes it possible to act so that items become included in or alienated from this realm. This happens preeminently by promising. Every commission of a wrong, every injury, consists in trespassing on a person’s own. The duties of justice consist not committing an injury.*® The neglect of other duties does not constitute a wrong (even if it may be considered wrong on other grounds). For instance: “. . . in beneficii negatione nulla est iniuria”.*®^ for instance. It is, finally, an essential feature of this outlook that in the case of injury, there arises a right to use force against the wrongdoer, and this right belongs to the injured party. To this sovereign realm pertain also one’s powers. Some are physical, some are mental. But there are also moral powers. These are also called rights. Pufendorf distinguishes four main types: (1) power over one’s own actions (libertas); (2) power over another’s actions {imperium)', (3) power over one’s own things {dominium); (4) power over another’s things {servitus). Schmauss p. 471; p. 472: . . cin ]us und justumante lege ullamcognitam.” Schmauss p 528. Schmauss p. 473. The other writers in this tradition all have similar lists. As for Hutcheson, sec (1747) 2, 4, 3 and (1755) 2, 5, 1. In his Elementa (1660*) 1, 18, 6, Pufendorf distinguishes three kinds of injury: (1) being denied what one ought to have; (2) having something taken fromoneself; (3) having evil inflicted without authority. Grotius 2, 2, 23.
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