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InVerklighetsbegreppet enligt Hägerström(1944) pp. 526-528,Martin Fries deals with Konrad Marc-Wogau’s interesting critique of Hägerström’s materialistic ontological monism.197 Marc-Wogau’s critique shares the same requirements for ontological monism and the self-identity of reality as Hägerström’s ontology, but does so from an idealistic point of view. In essence, Marc-Wogau’s counter proposition can be summed up as follows: there is only one reality, but this reality is of a spiritual nature and only consists of conscious entities (subjects) whose ideas make up the material world, which consequently lacks independent reality.According to Fries, the likeliest objection of Hägerström would be that no conscious entity can think of itself as being merely imagined. However,Marc-Wogau holds that Hägerström’s objection is based upon the illicit assumption that the conscious entities themselves cannot be understood as being non-spatial and non-temporal. And since this is Hägerström’s conclusion rather than his premiss, his argument constitutes a circulus vitiosus.Martin Fries’ defense of Hägerström’s argument concludes that Hägerström, contrary to Marc-Wogau, held that the empirical world itself constituted a prerequisite for the idealistic possibility of performing a self-reflecting act in which the subject is postulated as being separated from other objects.198 Finally, Hägerström was of the opinion that reality is a context that can never be deduced from the basis of individual experiences. On the contrary, reality is the context constituting the logical condition for the possibility of reflecting over the content of the individual experience as being something real.199 Reality is p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 3 96 197 Konrad Marc-Wogau’s critique was first published as Hägerströms verklighetsteori (Tiden, 1940), and is reprinted in: Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 85-112. 198 See Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 526-528. Cf. Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 85-112. 199 Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. 528. 3. 3. 4 mate rial i st ic ontolog ical moni sm