Hägerström’s analysis of subjective rationalism rests upon the observation, albeit only implicitly presented inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft, that subjectivism’s epistemological assumption, that it is necessary that a subject exists for it to be possible to pronounce a judgment, has been confused with the assumed ontological necessity of subjects.159 In addition, it is due to this confusion of epistemology and ontology that subjectivism arrives at the invalid conclusion that it is the subject that cannot not-exist, as well as the corollary that subjectivity and objectivity are epistemologically as well as ontologically identical with one another. According to subjectivism, it is the subjective idea regarding the natures of reality, validity, and existence that decides what is real, true, and existent. Ideas such as these were common in Swedish academia during the 19th Century, which was due to the decisive influence that German culture had over Swedish culture, as well as Professor Christopher Jacob Boström’s idealism.160 Historically,many of the major philosophical problems have been connected to philosophy’s attempts to establish a secure foundation to the epistemological and ontological postulates of philosophy, just as irrefutable as the foundations of logic.161The major problem connected to these attempts of deriving an apodictically secure epistemology or ontology is that these attempts invarp a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 3 84 3. 1 the subj ect ivi st ic confus ion of e p i stemolog ical nece s s i ty for ontolog ical nece s s i ty 3. 2 de scarte s ’ inf luence on mode rn phi losophy 159 Cf. Hägerström, P. d.W., pp. 17, 68-69, and 76-77. For Hägerström’s reversal of perspective indicates that the subjectivistic understanding of the world as identical with the subject, as subjectivism, in the Cartesian meaning, contends that the only necessary object to this world is the subject, must be rejected. 160 See Nordin, Boströmska skolan, passim. 161 E.g., Descartes, Valda skrifter, pp. 34-41; Kant, Cr. P. R., pp. B vii-xxii. See also Schüling, Die Geschichte der axiomatischen Methode im16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert: Wandlung der Wissenschaftsauffassung, pp. 110-112.
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