tive knowledge, which a strict interpretation of Hägerström’s objectivistic definition implies, this opens up the idea that objective concepts are intrinsic to the objects. The strict interpretation of Hägerström leads back to the epistemological question that Hägerström originally asked, but viewed from the opposite standpoint: If knowledge is object-dependent, excluding the subject, then is knowledge possible at all? Does the strict interpretation of Hägerström stand up to scrutiny? If we return to Hägerström’s solution to the epistemological problems, then we see that his standpoint allows an interpretation attempting to bring the opposite standpoints (N.B. not contradictory standpoints) together.78 As indicated above, Hägerström postulates that if subject and object exist in the same context of reality, then the possibility of an actual epistemological link between them exists.79 Provided that this is the case, objective knowledge is the product of an object-related judgment, in which the subject as far as possible submits to the object, and describes it in a manner that does not contradict the material order of the only possible context of reality in which both subject and object exist - physical reality. The establishment of synthetic knowledge is thus restricted to spatio-temporal reality and empirical facts, hence synthetic knowledge is a posteriori and non-transcendent. This once again directs attention to the onlycriterium veri which is subjected to a unitarian understanding of reality - namely the correspondence theory of truth. p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 2 58 78 Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev (Ett brev till Arnold Sölvén av den 4 januari 1931. Med inledning och efterord av adressaten),”Tiden : socialdemokratisk ide- och debattidskrift 32 (1941): pp. 89-91.This article contains a letter that Hägerström wrote on 4 January 1931 to Arnold Sölvén, in which Hägerström explains his philosophy and aims to disprove claims that he was an epistemological subjectivist. In locus citatus Hägerström expounds a view that allows a certain degree of subjectivism and a certain degree of objectivism, but neither position is taken to its extreme. Hägerström’s conclusion is that either extreme leads to totally arbitrary determinations of knowledge, and it is the extreme positions of subjectivism and realism that lead to the metaphysical fallacies. 79 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 21-22.