point’s contradictory theory of truth demonstrates Hägerström’s new position as a systematic defense of the principle of correspondence. Hägerström’s “revolutionary” idea entailed that the object was not inaccessible to the knowledge-seeking subject.The only condition under which the object could be said to be (or become) “inaccessible” to the knowledge seeking subject was if the object was endowed with metaphysical qualities - that is qualities impossible to determine in an objectively, non-contradictory manner within the spatio-temporal context.69 However, since objects, according to Hägerström, cannot have supernatural or supersensible qualities these qualities must originate from something other than the object, for instance, the subject and its propensity to exaggerate both its epistemological reach and ontological importance.70 Accordingly, any metaphysical qualities are objectively indeterminable as well as contradictory, whereby they are epistemologically inaccessible and lack any form of intelligible truth value, whereby, finally, the metaphysical qualities lose epistemological as well as ontological relevance. As a consequence of the indeterminacy of metaphysical characteristics metaphysical ideas at best express a subject’s personal wishes regarding the best or proper manner according to which reality ought to be organized. From a scientific point of view, metaphysical ideas maintained in contradiction to facts are false and of no positive scientific relevance. Hägerström, finally concludes that the analysis of metaphysical ideas and concepts reveal them as unintelligible concatenations of words,71 but never descriptions of reality, whereupon there is nothing further to be said of them. p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 2 56 69 See for example: Hägerström, Socialfilosofiska uppsatser, ed. Fries, passim; Religionsfilosofi, ed. Fries, passim. 70 Supernatural and super-sensible are terms that according to Hägerström’s philosophy indicate that the one is dealing with things, facts, and knowledge that transcend empirical reality and experience. 71 See Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring på privaträttens område,” in Rätten och viljan: två uppsatser ånyo utg. av Karl Olivecrona, pp. 99-100; “The Conception of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private Law,” in Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals:Axel Hägerström, pp. 299-300.