RB 65

transcendental.What Hägerström describes in “Botanisten och filosofen” is the dialectics of thought.94 In order for the conceptual formulation to achieve the needed level of objectivism, the concept must be subjected to a process of reflection wherein the epistemological agent observes and reflects over an object in a dialectic process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until the needed level of conceptual determination has been reached.95 What is interesting is that this process appears to be possible to conduct in a universal as well as in a particular direction, that is, to be conducted inductively as well as deductively, and synthetically as well as analytically.The context reveals what type of conceptual determination the observer is conducting. The general theme or leading principle of “Botanisten och filosofen” is identical to that of Begreppet viljeförklaring på privaträttens område (The Conception of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private Law), namely, a discussion on whether or not philosophy has anything at all to say science.96 “Quid Saulus inter prophetas?” is the question posed in both texts, and Hägerström’s interpretation of the question is roughly this:What does a philosopher have that contributes to the special sciences?What does philosophy have that contributes to empirical sciences?97 As can be seen, it is not obvious whether or not a philosopher has anything at all to contribute to science, and if so, how. It is thus philosophy’s relevance to, or for, the specific branches of science that is open to debate.The burden of proof is thus placed upon the Philosopher, whose contributions to the material sciences are restricted to two specific details - epistemology, and conceptual analysis. Hägerström’s standpoint thus differs considerably from p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 2 198 94 Hägerström, “Botanisten och filosofen” (1910); “B. o. F.” 95 Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” pp. 78-95. 96 Ibid., p. 39; Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99;“Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. 97 Hägerström, “I moralpsykologiska frågor II,” pp. 98-99. 2 . 9 concluding remarks