ström’s “relative Subjektivierung.”321 Since the explanation falls back on a greater context, how does one assure oneself that the greater context itself does not constitute an expression of pure subjectivism?322 Is the greater context real or imagined? How must this context be conceptualized in order for it to correspond to a reality context that is not merely imagined? There is but one alternative in the explanatory scheme of contextualization that leads away from subjectivism, and that is the laws of contradictions and identity; for it is only those specific contexts that are possible to compare with one another consistently that provide an explanation.323 If an explanation reveals a contradiction, then at least one of the compared contexts is indeterminate and contradictory, and thus unreal. Furthermore, for experience and knowledge derived from experience, there is but the empirical context. Because it is only through sensible temporalization and localization, that is specification, that the individual conscious subjects can distinguish themselves from their surroundings and from other individual conscious subjects.324 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 145 321 Ibid. See also Fries,Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 526-528. Cf. Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 85-112. 322 Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 401-403. 323 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 18-19 and 23. See also Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 401-403. 324 Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 402-403.