RB 65

continue and are thus trustworthy facts. On the other hand, induction provides conclusions that help us to determine the spatial world to which we belong; which perceptions that are useless in the determination of spatial reality, such as hallucinations; and finally, which perceptions that represent reality, the truth.289 All in all, Hägerström argues, every judgment presupposes a determinate, certain spatial world, namely the physical world that we live in. For it is only in philosophy in general that one, incorrectly, assumes that it is possible to determine the truth value of a judgment without a simultaneous supposition of a determinate, certain world.290 It is in metaphysical philosophy that one assumes that it is possible to determine the truth question once and for all, and that it is possible to determine truth independently of reality.The world in which we live only exists for us - without any solipsistic or subjectivistic connotations - through our experiences and the inductive inferences that we draw from them. Logically speaking this demands that the method applied to determine the actual and real structure of this world must be based uponexperience, which leaves us with induction.To Hägerström, induction is repeatedly verified by the fact that the predictions regarding the course of the world tend to be verified.291 On account of the fact that it is impossible to have any knowledge of anything external of physical reality, knowledge and cognition is accordingly restricted to spatial and temporal circumstances, facts, and objects. One reason is that humans only exist in spatio-temporal physical reality, whereby human knowledge is restricted to events, facts, objects, and other things that exist within this sphere.In addition,it is experience of such events that constitutes the exclusive basis for knowledge, for that time and space,which is presupposedwith regard to human consciousness, that has its subjective content via experience alone. Consequently, it is only those thoughts that have experience as their point p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 134 289 Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 88-89. 290 Ibid 291 Ibid.