RB 65

fact, one must thus account of that which has already been observed, and either, or both, formulate predictions of the future, generalizations, and general laws concerning the qualities, attributes, or behavior of an examined group of particulars.This is, for example, how Aristotle understood what induction should strive to do. Besides stating generalities, the conclusions reached through enumerative induction serve a classifying function in that they are applied to formulate the concepts and notions we use to describe reality. Induction, therefore, constitutes a substantial part of the processes through which we acquire and determine empirical knowledge, and set this empirical knowledge to practical use. In order for this to be possible, one must therefore formulate a criterion of validity determining how and when valid inductions should be performed, thereby tacitly staking the outer limits for the reach and validity of inductive conclusions. Having this point of view in mind,the problems connected to induction will therefore be central to the analysis of Hägerström’s philosophy. Since, even if Hägerström does not exclusively address the problems of induction, his philosophy is concerned with an associated complex of philosophical problems - those connected to the formation of concepts and those connected to conceptual analysis. These are two questions that cannot be wholly separated from induction, especially not if one concerns oneself with concepts that have or claim to have an empirical content, that is, synthetic concepts and synthetic knowledge, and not only analytic concepts and ditto knowledge (cf. positive law - natural law). So by addressing this specific problem it will be possible to illuminate those epistemological and ontological issues that recur throughout Hägerström’s philosophy and in research on Hägerström. If we return to the discussion regarding the differences between p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 120 4 . 2 . 1 a poste riori ce rtainty vs. a priori ce rtainty