c o n t e n t s 12 Sub j ect iv i sm - Ob j ect iv i sm: Häge r ström’s Cope rn i can Revolut i on Cont i nue d The Subjectivistic Confusion of Epistemological Necessity for Ontological Necessity Descartes’ Influence on Modern Philosophy Anti-subjectivism1908 and 1929 “Reality” and “Self-identity” Correlativity and Identity “Selbstidentität” - Determinateness: Metaphysical Connotations Materialistic Ontological Monism Restatement of the Epistemological Dilemma: The Principle of Identity Essential Metaphysics in “Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft” Real Concepts and Unreal Concepts “Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft’s” Consequences for Hägerström’sProgram of Conceptual Analysis: Conceptual Analysis Made Impossible Excursus: Indeterminateness vs.Vagueness Summary and Conclusions (Conceptual Theory) I nduct i on : The Road to Ob j ect - knowle dge Hägerström’s Analysis Hägerström’s Analysis of the Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge Solution to the Aporia of Inductive Reasoning Inductive Knowledge: Absolute or Relative? A posteriori Certainty vs. A priori Certainty The Transcendent Argument The Formal Invalidity of the Transcendental Argument Excursus: Dogmatism as a Scientific Premiss Denying Inductive Inferences:A Logical Impossibility? Induction: Conclusions A. Induction is Based upon Empirical Data and Refers only to Empirical Data B. Inductive Inferences are only StatisticallyVerifiable, not DeductivelyVerifiable C. Induction is neither Other-worldly nor Transcendental D.There Exist neither Absolute Concepts nor Absolute Knowledge Summary Ob j ect iv i ty, the Sc i e nt i f i c Wor ld Vi ew, and the Pr i nc i p le of Par s imony The Principle of Parsimony: One world, one Reality, one Context 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.2 3.3.6.3 3.3.7 4 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.2.1 4.2.2.2 4.2.2.3 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.2.5 4.2.6 4.2.7 4.2.8 5 5.1 82 84 84 89 91 92 94 96 97 99 102 106 107 108 111 112 113 116 118 120 124 125 130 131 132 133 135 138 139 139 141 142
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