For me, the greatest obstacle to making progress in understanding ancient legal history is the approach of knowing “What must have been.” Texts that do not fit are brushed aside as interpolated or given a twisted meaning. A fine example for the Decalogue is by Richard J. Clifford in The New Jerome Biblical Commentary edd. Raymond E. Brown et al. (Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J., ), p. . He writes with regard to Exo-dus .: “Kidnapping is prohibited: ordinary theft is forbidden by the last commandment.” He notes the problem: the seventh com-mandment seems to be unnecessary because it is covered by the last commandment. Instead of facing the challlenge of what this means for the formation of the Decalogue he sidesteps the issue giving verse . an unacceptable and restricted meaning. The ordinary meaning of the verb in the Hebrew Bible and of the Greek of the Septuagint is ‘to steal.’ Of course, kidnappping is a form of stealing -- see Exodus . where the same verb is used - but there is nothing in the text to justify such a narrow interpretation. Besides, the approach does not meet the case. Even on this approach the seventh commandment would be superfluous as covered by the last. Clifford is also aware of the problem that the last commandment does not relate to action but to a state of mind. He writes of .: “As comparable inscriptions make clear, hamad means conspiracy, taking steps to steal (not merely “covet”).” But again, ‘covet’ is the standard meaning of the Hebrew and Greek. And again, an interpretation such as ‘to conspire’ does not meet the case: a commandment not to kidnap would still be unnecessary as covered by this provision. APPENDIX I I -
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