one else. What is to count as the time of killing for the first mortal blow? The issue is crucial, again if we take into account an inheritance or legacy to the slave. But the issue is not settled in Roman law. The sensible approach for jurists, especially those who were top bureaucrats, would have been to have issued an imperial ruling that would replace thelex Aquilia. But a jurist’s reputation did not depend on the legal reform but on his skill in interpretation. So, for this law, the jurists adopted a new and narrow interpretation of “killing”, and distinguished it from “furnishing a cause of death”. The remedy for the latter would have no reference to the slave’s value in the past year. It is worth stressing that there is no moral difference between killing and furnishing a cause of death. The statute was not replaced, not even in the great Byzantine codification of Justinian. But, by that time the distinction between killing and furnishing a cause of death was even more absurd because the old system of procedure which drew a sharp distinction between one action and another had disappeared. This system could not last forever, and during the Reception the lex Aquilia lost its most peculiar features. Still, even at the present time in South Africa the main action for delict is on Aquilian liability. Lecture is a patchwork, with the patches being of unequal dimensions. Law by its nature must have authority. Each legal rule must have its rationale. But what is the connection between authority and the rationale of law? Is there one connection or may there be many? Must the rationale be expressed? Must it be known to, or understood by the users of the law? May the rationale change yet the law remain the same? The lecture returns to themes in the preceding lectures, but using different examples. Authority, in various guises is central to law: to enforce the law, and to make it acceptable. Every legal institution and rule must, I suppose, have at least one rationale. But often the ratio-
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