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himself of the practice of nations, as a solid proof of the acknowledged laws of nations.”181 He continued: Story’s commendation is self-evident. And that Story followed Huber for the basic principles of conflict of laws is believed by all subsequent scholars.183 But there can also be no doubt that Story misunderstood or misrepresented Huber. The best evidence comes from the end of the passage just quoted and his own very next paragraphs:  181 Conflict, p. 32. Actually, there is no sign in Huber that he is following the practice of nations. Huber does cite Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis(On the law of war and peace). 2.11.5, but not for anything relevant to Story’s proposition. 182Conflict p. 32. 183 See the references in Watson, Story, p. 107 n.7. Some attempts have been made, but without success, to undervalue the authority of Huberus. It is certainly true, that he is not often spoken of, except by jurists belonging to the Dutch School. Boulenois, however, has quoted his third and last axiom with manifest approbation. But it will require very little aid of authority to countenance his merits, if his maxims are well founded; and if they are not, no approbation, founded on foreign recognitions, can disguise their defects. It is not, however, a slight recommendation of his works, that hitherto he has possessed an undisputed preference on this subject over other continental jurists, as well in England as in America. Indeed, his two first maxims will in the present day scarcely be disputed by any one; and the last seems irresistibly to flow from the right and duty of every nation to protect its own subjects against injuries resulting from the unjust and prejudicial influence of foreign laws; and to refuse its aid to carry into effect any foreign laws, which are repugnant to its own interests and polity.182 It is difficult to conceive, upon what ground a claim can be rested, to give to any municipal laws an extra-territorial effect, when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other nations or their subjects. It would at once annihilate the sovereignty and equality of the nations, which should be called upon to recognize and enforce them; or compel them to desert their own proper interest and duty in favor of strangers, who were regardless of both. A claim, so naked of principle and authority to support it, is wholly inadmissible It has been thought by some jurists, that the term, “comity,” is not sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws, when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. And it has been suggested, that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; that it is not so much a matter of comity, or courtesy, as of paramount moral duty. Now,

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