What matters is that (as I observed) there is an emptiness in the application of the philosophical principle. Moreover, the natural result of the decision is the separation of mother and child, with a diminished survival rate for the latter. Even from the examples - they can be generalized - in this introductory section, we can draw some generalizations about the Roman jurists. Where there was a statute that in itself, was both the rationale and the authority for their opinion, they did not seek to go beyond the statute to discover its rationale. Nor did they seek to have the statute altered or removed by governmental intervention. Law reform by that method was not their business. Their own prestige depended on their skill in interpreting.115 That was how they modified the law. The authority of an interpretation depended on the authority of the jurists but also to some extent on the rationale behind the opinion. But often the jurists’ rationale was weak or it was non-existent.116 Thus, the Roman jurists were often little interested in setting out the context and rationale of a statute or edict or a juristic opinion. Authority by itself frequently takes place of rationale and authority. Thus, it is not surprising to find texts such as D. .. from Julian’s Digest, book : Julian was consul, probably in . Even earlier we have D. .. from Neratius’ Parchments, book : Neratius was consul suffectus in . These last texts reveal incidentally that in classical Rome law could be regarded as settled. We should also addD. .. from Paul’s book 115 See Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law(Athens, GA., 1995). 116 See, above all, Franz Horak, Rationes Decidendi (Innbruck, 1969). It is not possible to find an underlying reason for everything which was settled by our forebears. Accordingly, it is not right to go ferreting after the motives which are settled as law. To do otherwise is to subvert many present certainties.
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