encouragement ro the novice. I'his said, the main reasons tor adopting a eonstruetix istie point of departure rest in how such a Sf/hsnrrständ)iis seems to he more eatalvtie towards understanding the possible efi'ccts upon the reader of a histor\’, some of which would he more desirable than others, and in how its concomitant language more adequatelv translates this insight into a critical anahsis. In sum, the constructi\ ist's self-understanding is nor more true hut more suitable or desirable. A few words of clarification are in place, do speak of an inrerpretative freedom to construct a history is in mv opinion to imply a corresponding responsibilir\' on the historian's part to do it with care taken to the social consequences of the te.\t being read, studied, digested and possibly referred to. In short; of it being recamstructed. Such an implication is at least fully intended on m\’ part. Language has conseqences upon the reader whose understanding of something ine\ irably takes shape in a particular direction during the read, ("onsequences upon the reader will in turn ha\e siK'ietal consequences. I'his becomes \ ery tangible for a legislator or a contracting party. How will their statute or contract respectiyeh' be (re)constructed.^ After all, "(l]ike the other gestures and s\’mbols which men use to mark their entr\’ into legal relationships words, whether written or spoken, can ne\ er fully e.xpress what was intended."" Drafting is done with an eye to its likeK- (re)consrruction. 'Lhe consequences of the construction of an historical te.xt may at first sight seem less concrete than that of a contract or a statutorx’ text, but appearance should nor fool us. An historian not onb' constructs a history; she also assists in constructing a commutiity. In writing a histor\’ for law- \'ers, the historian may assist in the emergence or maintenance of a particular lawyer identity. With the maintenance of a constructed identity, we would expect to find a fairh homogeneous beha\ iour: 20
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