times we ha\ e the e\ idence of writers such as Li\ So ins gnitiiimas meaning "international law" is almost in\ isible in juristic writings. Similarlv, with this stress on interpreting pri\ate law, the jurists ga\e no thought to natural law. For them phihcsophical notions of natural law were a non-e\ent. 'Fhe interpretation allowed to the pontiffs was that of the Fweh e I'ahles, hence also of law deri\ ing from it: ci\'il law. But much law was in effect created hv the praetors, the important elected officials who had control of the courts, and who annuallv set out an Edict demonstrating the actions thev would allow. 'I'his edictal law was treated as outside of the basic remit of the jurists. The earliest juristic commentaries on the ITlict are considerably later than those on the d'weKe 'fables or the ci\ il law.’^ Naturally, thev had to deal with the Edict - after all, it was an essential element in private law - hut until the end t)f the classical period, the great jurists like Llpian wrote separate commentaries on ci\ il and on edictal law; a nonsensical approach since there was only one main system of courts. But the later edictal law was a\ ailahle usualK’ to foreigners as well as to citizens: ins gcnrinm. Here then we have the juristic formulation, which made for confusion. Natural law is nothing. International law is ignored. Still, the terms ins natunilc and ins gentium have to be noticed. Ins natnrale is swept awa\' as instinct. Ins gentium, in a ct)nfT.ised wav, becomes the law common to Romans and others \I little more must he said about the confusion in the te.xts. fhe 34 The first commentary on the Edict was by Servius at the end of the republic. It was very short, in only two books: Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946), p. 91. 38
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