marter, except that the ///.lY/V/zrc.r was the primary educational tool of law students. \ In conclusion I would like to sa\’ a little in explanation. Law operates, or should operate, on the le\ el of reality. Law dex elops on the le\el of invagination. Frequently, reality and imagination do not mesh. Sometimes imagination outstrips social realit)’. Often social reality lea\ es imagination far behind. A legal rule or institution, once in place, ma\ he hard to shift. And a starting point in law may ha- \ e \ ery unexpected consequences, and may determine the course of future de\ elopment." Law casts long shadows. For example, the famous Roman codification, the 'Fwelye Fables, of around q^i/qs-o B.t:. gave equalitv’ in law^ to patricians and plebeians, but it presented onl\' the law that the patricians were willing to share with the piebeians: pri\ ate law alone, not public law or public office. ' in an adroit mox e, the patricians gat e a monopoly of interpretation of the Fwelye Fables to the C'ollege of Pontiffs, the main priestly body, w hose members of necessity were patrician. IVom this C>ollege de- \ eloped the rise of the Roman jurists. But true to their original remit, the jurists restricted their attention to legal interpretation, not to reform and not to systematization. Likewise, their attention centered on pri\ate law, the contents of the dwehe Fables. I^ublic law was almost entireh’ ignored, lienee they ignored international law which in Rome actually had a rich heritage. I'or the early period 1 would mention the ins fctiale which controlled relations between the Romans and other Latins,” for later 31 See infra Chapter 3. 32 See, e.g., Watson, Spirit, pp. 55ff. 33 Cf. Alan Watson, International Lawin Archaic Rome: IVar and Religion (Baltimore, 1993). 37
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