IJiit tlic law which narural reason makes tor all mankind is applied in rhe same wa\' e\ervwhere. It is called 'the law ot'all peoples' because it is common to e\ erv nation. The lawot the Roman people is also partlv its own and partK' common to all mankind, \\ hich parts are which we will explain below.-'’ The words in italics are a reconstruction; the\' were written in red ink that has faded. Nothing is said of natural law. Ins gnitinw is not used for international law or e\ en tor that part ot Roman pri\ ate law that was open to foreigners. It is used e.\clusi\el)’ for that m\ thical law established b\- natural reastm and found among all people. VIII rhe scene was set; or rhe unscene was unset. Natural law in justinian's Institutes was firmlv detached trom philosophical and religious notions of narural law. But then it was somewhat, and amhiguouslv, reattached ^;/.i.2.ii). d'hough legal theorists like Aquinas and Suarez" might stress the importance and ultimate religious significance of natural law, pragmatic jurists, howener religious in their own li\es, saw something different. For instance, in Spain, .\lfonzo the \\ ise, whose great and enormous compilation Las Siete Partnias prohablv took shape around I26^, could praise libertx’ as natural, and then treat slavery as part of the ius gentium with no indication that sla\'er\- was improper or contrar\’ to religion.’'^ rhe subsequent interpretation of the justinianic texts was \ arious. But one can generalize. Thus ius natunile, it was claimed, had two senses: improperb’ it was instinct common to all animals including 26 The translation is that of W.M. Gordon and O.F. Robinson, the Institutes of Gaius (London, 1988), p. 20. 27 De Legibus, ac deo legislatore (1612). 28 Las Siete Partidas 1.1.2; 4.21.1; 4.22; cf. Watson, Roman Law, pp. 2i6f. 34
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