III We Inn e lonked at the pruicipiumand the heginning or§ i ot yi-2If iny analvsis is accurate, something \er\' odd is gtnng on. We are introduced to natural law, bereft of all religious and philosophical implications. After the claim that law came from three sources, (i) common to all animals, (2) common to mankind, {7,) proper to one state, then surprisinglv natural law appears as mere instinct. Not only that, the description of this instinct is inaccurate. Rearing of offspring is not uni\ ersal among animals. I'hen § i begins as if natural law was no law at all, or so different in kind from /Wmv/cand ins gefitiuwas to be inccmsequential. The law of a particular state and law found among states appear in an arrangement contrary to what one would expect if natural law was law, and is even contrary to the arrangement in the title heading. IV § I continues with a description o\ itis civile. But then comes what is truh’ astonishing, the discussion of ins gentium. "But the insgentium is common to all of the human race." fhen in § 2 on ius gentium-. "hrom the demands of events and human necessities, human societies established certain laws for themseKes; for wars broke out, and capti\ities followed, and sla\er\' which is contrarx’ to natural law. For by natural law, from the beginning all men were free." Here the Institutes \\'SC'S< ius gentium to mean (among other things) "international law," a sense scarceh’ found in the Roman jurists-it appears onl\’ twice in the Digest, at D. i.i.r and D. s'o.-'.uS(i7)-though it is in Cucero, and is particularly common in Idvy.'^ What we do not ha\ e here is ius gentium meaning that part of the law within a state that is found 28
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