Sa\ ijjjiu' has ofron been srronglv criticized for failing to gi\ e an adequate definition of the \oIk. fhe Nazis remedied this h\' defining \’olk as an issue of race. Karl Loewenstein sadly notes that the only tangible result of the racial mvth in pri\ ate law was anti-Semitism."' A recurring theme in Nazi literature is state, race, land, labor, honor, cultural and spiritual \ alues.^'’ These conclusions are ob\ ious from the basic premises, with the possible e.xception of honor. The concept of race, for example, brings with it a correlation of land. Still, e\ en with 'honor' there may be a historical reminiscence. One of the most famous and influential law books of the 19th centur\’ was Rudolph \ ()n Jhering's Dcr Kiinipf itnis Rccbt, first published in uS-2, which went into numerous editions, and which was earh’ translated into many languages. I'he basic argument is simply that law de\elops from strife, a battle to prmect one's rights. Indeed, he claims that one has a moral dut\’ to societ\ to fight for one's rights, and thus de\elop law. Different people value different rights. And one right, valued more in one race or nation than another, is honor. \\v suggestion, especially after such a long conclusion, is banal. The common priv ate law for Turope shmild seek to be its own authoritv’. I'or this it must represent all the nations, even the smallest, and not seek to favor the most powerful. No indiv idual nation should predominate. For a code, a firm attempt must be made to restrain legal chauv inistic members on any drafting committee. The need for authority is especiallv' urgent when the law is transnaticmal, and concerns such a personal matter as private law. Mv very short suggestion, coupled with the very long conclusion, indicates the importance I attach to the issue, and its difficulty. .\ seventh conclusion is the need for appropriate legal education 39 'Third Reich,' p. 795. 40 See, e.g., Loewenstein, 'Third Reich,' p. 780. 175
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