VI '!"() conclude. I heliexe I lia\e shown that massive successful borrowing is commonplace in law. Indeed, 1 beliexe 1 ha\e indicated, though hv example here rather than h\' express statement, that borrowing is usualK' the major factor in legal change. Legal borrow ing 1 would ei]uate w ith the notion of legal transplants. 1 find it difficult to imagine that ainone would deny that legal borrowing is of enormous importance in legal development. Likewise 1 find it hard to imagine that ainone would believe that the borrowed rule would operate in exaetb’ the wa\' it did in its other home. \\ hat 1 think is significant in the context of this chapter is not the identit\- of interpretation but the fact that identit\- of'rule does lead to much greater similarit\’ between two systems. In no wav should one neglect the differences, d'hev are also fundamental in understanding how, wh>' and when law changes, the direction of legal change, and how law’ de\ elops in the societ\' in which it operates. 1 would insist, contrary to what seems to be Legrand's approach in his paper, that it is not abstract legal philosoplv about "what must be" that enables us to understand the relationship of hnv to society, but detailed examination of law and legal change (and legal stabilit}’) in a number of systems that ha\e been in contact. But that detailed examination is hard work. MI 1 should like to return to Pierre I.egrand. lie writes: "I do not want to caricature Watson's position."'" But he does, so grossh’ that it cannot be accidental. 1 belie\ e this is the result of his stated hosti25 'Impossibility,' p. 112. 115
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