hiiig. I could nor agree more. Indeed from early da\ s 1 ha\e argued that a rule once transplanted is different in its new home. I .Much about I.egrand's approach and our disagreement is re\ealed hy his statement (following Benjamin) that the word Brot 'xn (ierman means something different from the French word pui)i. I agree, of course, hut in the context of law the point is simplistic in at least two fundamental regards. f irst, pain in fVench and in France is nor the same as pain in fVench and in fVance. for a poor \ illage housewife 'bread' has nor the same meaning as for the wealthy Parisian businessman. She has much less choice, is close to the source of supply, and bread plays a \ ery different role in the famih' diet. Its role in daily life is different. I need not elaborate. But the same is true for law within a single countr)’, e\en within a single town. Fhe possession of cocaine is, let us imagine, illegal. Fhat means one thing to the petty dealer who sees it as his sole hope of escaping from his ghetto, quite another to the recreational user, quite another to noncriminals who live in the same street as the gangs, quite another to law enforcement officers. It is banal to notice that the same legal rule operates differently in two countries: it operates to different effect e\'en within one. Secondly, law is different frombread because in all its manifestations it is an element of the state. ’Fhe state is responsible for its coming into being, for its application and for its efficac\'. Bread and its consumption are much more matters of personal choice. Of course, where a written statutory law is the same within two countries, its judicial interpretation ma\' well differ because of tradition and 7 'Impossibility,' p. 117. 103
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