301 Summary Crime and Punishment according to More Geometrico — a Christian Aristotelian Demand BYJUR. AND FIL. KAND. BO H. LINDBERG The author investigated first the varied usages of the term arhitrio, choice, judgement, which occurred in seventeenth and eighteenth century Swedish law both in theory and in practice. Its usage shifted greatly, from the designation of the common authority of judges to conduct processes in general, to a more limited usage of the term, as, for example, the authority to determine penalties within the application of criminal law. The context within which the term occurred could also vary in another way, that is, in the reaching of a verdict where precepts to a greater of lesser degree were lacking. The termcould, in certain cases, represent a decision not bounded by precepts, but characterized by responsible, wise judgement according to the best of one’s ability and understanding. Conversely, such could also be considered arbitrary, self-interested decision-making, sometimes in obvious conflict with existing regulations. After having in this manner presented several usages of the term, the author looked more closely at one of its usages, that is, its usage within criminal law, where it often represents special authority to pass judgement, the common rule concerningthe judge’s right to modify without latitude the penalties prescribed in the penal code. Such modifications could either be an increase in of a modulation of a penalty. A third alternative was the determination or the penalty under the law. Everything depended upon circumstantiae, the circumstances in the particular case. The author found, in connection with Scholasticism’s usual concept of the law, that the continuation of the common rule concerning the judge’s right to take the circumstances into consideration, depended upon Scholasticism’s understanding, common since Antiquity, that the law did not comprise a complete source of norms for the judge. Reality is altogether too complicated. The judge
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