RS 33

the will of the testator and the clausula “rebus sic stantibus” antee the livelihood of its nuns. The abbess therefore intended to distribute the part of money destined for the poor among the nuns themselves. At first glance, according to Petrus, the abbess could not have done it, most of all because it would have been contrary to the deceased’s will, since there was no mention in the testament of the possibility of including the nuns in the category of “poor people”. After recalling that the executors’ powers depend entirely on the literal instructions contained in the testament, as if it were a mandateinter vivos (between living persons), Petrus adds that the monastery had already been the recipient of a special bequest, consisting of a certain sum of money, and the allocation of the remainder, originally intended to help the poor, would have constituted an additional acquisition, which seemed to contradict the will of the testatrix. A second objection concerned the abbess’s role as the only surviving executor, which would have prevented her from distributing the rest of the legacy among her own nuns; it was a strict rule that one could not have jurisdiction over oneself. Despite these objections, Petrus nevertheless argues that the contrary position is more appropriate from a legal point of view, if only one considers the changed situation of the monastery after the death of the testatrix. His arguments on the relevance to be attributed to the change of circumstances extend the scope of applicability of the principle “rebus sic stantibus” to all legal acts identifiable as dispositions of will; due to the occurrence of a new cause, he explains, one can withdraw from any of those acts without distorting the will of the disposer, who would have disposed otherwise if he or she could have foreseen the change of circumstances. This applies to legislative acts, to testamentary dispositions following a change in the personal status or conduct of the recipient, to oaths and any other obligation, to privileges, and to pacts and agreements.19 228 19 The novelty introduced in this list of acts especially concerns the extension of the clausula’s effectiveness to norms of a legislative nature and acts of private will, such as testamentary dispositions, agreements, and pacts. Later, contracts would be also explicitly included. On the other hand, statutaandprivilegiahad already been associated with oaths, as fields of application of the implied term “si res in eodem statu permanserit”, by Richardus Malumbra in the first decades of the 14th century; see Besta 1894, p. 102.

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