part vi • european legal integration • nina-louisa arold lorenz Concurring, Judge Motoc refreshes our memory of Ancient Greek myths and modern philosophy: Modern philosophers, such as Camus and Dworkin here, tend to be cited by judges to strengthen their legal arguments.63 The ECtHRseems generally more flexible in its approach to legal sources, and its judges display greater legal creativity when writing individual opinions. Is the use of philosophy and other alternative sources limited to the ECtHR? Not at all. The same is true of theCJEUtoo – though due to the structure of the CJEU, they are found in the opinions of advocates general, where individual members of the Court make their legal arguments. InBirgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens, a case about difference in treatment based on age, advocate general Sharpston reminds us of Ancient Greece and the treatment of slaves to explain the concept of ‘equality’ in a case about difference in treatment because of age. whether there had been a sufficient investigation of the death of the individual. Establishing that the ECtHRhad jurisdiction, the bench also found a violation of ECHRArt. 2. 63 Interestingly, Dworkin’s famous work ‘Taking rights seriously’ is cited in a number of judgements. See alsoNaït-Liman v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber ECtHR judgement of 15 March 2018, dissenting opinion Judge Dedov. Center for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Campeanu v. Romania, ECtHRjudgement of 14 July 2014, dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque; Giem s.r.l. and Others v. Italy, ECtHR judgement of 28 June 2018, Judge Motoc in her concurring opinion citing Dworkin and Gadamer. 314 A human being’s path to self-awareness is similar to that of Sisyphus. Albert Camus’s essay provides aremarkable illustration of the history of philosophy in this regard. But can we expect such self-awareness on the part of a court with regard to issues as difficult as the one addressed in this judgement? Will the Court not be condemned to remain ‘estranged from itself ’? In the language of philosophy of law, and having regard to the principle of ‘law as integrity’ as it has been interpreted by Ronald Dworkin, it seems that a court can never explicitly admit to the various interpretive approaches of stare decisis. A moment’s historical reflection will show that statements about ‘equality’, when deconstructed, have often meant ‘equality of treatment, in particular respects, for those inside the magic circle’ rather than ‘equality of treatment in every relevant respect for absolutely everyone’. In the Athens of Pericles, citizens of the polis might claim a right to equal treatment in respect of access to justice or civic advancement; but the concept of equality excluded
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