a kaleidoscope of people phy’ in the case law showed that (i) philosophy is part of the facts; (ii) philosophy is part of a comparison with other documents of international law; (iii) philosophy is used to explain the meaning of the ECHRor EUlaw; and (iv) philosophy is used to support legal arguments.60 Taking the last factor, for example, we find instances in the case law which use such sources to disclose their individual views on law. At theECtHR, individual judges present their own legal argument and how it differs from the majority in separate (concurring or dissenting) opinions. InZdankova v. Latvia, a case about the right of a member of the Russian minority in Latvia and former member of the communist party to stand in an election (ECHR Art. 3 Protocol 1), Judge Zupancic recalls modern philosophy and the Bible in his dissenting view: More recently, Jaloud v. The Netherlands was a case about the shooting of an Iraqi passenger in a car that failed to stop at a vehicle checkpoint in southern Iraq and the subsequent investigations by the Netherlands.62 tosz Wojciechowski, Marek Zirk-Sadowski & Karolina Cern (eds.), Towards the Recognition of Minority Groups: Legal and Communication Strategies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 129 ff.; Nina-Louisa Arold, ‘Promoting cracks in the surface: Strasbourg changing Swedish legal culture’, in Lisbet Christoffersen et al. (eds.) Law and Religion in the Twenty-first century: Nordic Perspective, New Life in the Ruins: Pluralistic renewal in the Lutheran setting (Copenhagen: Jurist &Ökonomsförlaget, 2010), 275 ff. 60 See Arold 2014, 134. 61 Zdanoka v. Latvia, ECtHRjudgement of 16March 2006, dissenting opinion Judge Zupancic, my emphasis. 62 Jaloud v. The Netherlands, ECtHRjudgement of 20 November 2014, my emphasis. There had been shots fired fromacar earlier that night, aDutch patrol was asked to help, and they fired at the car. TheECtHRhad to decide whether the case fell under its jurisdiction, and 313 Karl Popper formulated this clearly. He maintained that democracy is for everybody except for those who would destroy it. We are to be tolerant to everything except to acts of intolerance. Two questions derive from this general principle. First, are those who were intolerant in the past subsequently entitled to tolerance? This is a question of Biblical proportions. Should the talionic tooth-for-tooth retributive logic of the Old Testament apply, or should human rights be universal not just in space but also in time? Does this mean turning the other cheek to those who slapped us? Second, what kind of (simultaneous) intolerance should be directed at those who are themselves intolerant?61
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