discussion 317 considered a lower court’s decision. This always happened in cases of serious criminality meriting capital punishment. Thus in Sweden, leuterationwas an instrument of controlling the use of capital punishment and had little to do with the interests of the parties to the case. A control of capital punishment was, of course, nothing typically Swedish, but a common task that high courts everywhere in Europe assumed. The third difference is thatleuterationtook place automatically, without any need from the accused to ask for it. In fact, since leuteration sometimes took place within a matter of days, any such intervention would often have been difficult if not impossible. The automatic nature of leuteration also explains the fact that the system could function without lawyers. Actual appeals, following the general ius commune practice, were forbidden in criminal cases, although as far as we know, this rule was not quite systematically followed in Sweden as the appeals became more and more tolerated as the seventeenth century advanced. Professor Diestelkamp is completely right in asserting that more research is needed on how systems attempting to become “learned” could develop when professional lawyers were scarce. Comparative works in this area would be more than welcome. SUUM CUIQUE TRIBUERE Legal Contexts, Judicial Archetypes and Deep-Structures Regarding Courts of Appeal and Judiciaries from Early Modern to Late Modern Europe
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