sören koch state representatives. Even though Høyer did not explicitly argue for a functional separation of the judiciary and the administration or that appellate courts should consist of more than one judge,104 his demand for professionalization contained an essential ingredient for the debates that took place in the forefront of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814.105 The most radical change in the Norwegian legal system took place in 1797when the traditional systemof appeal was abolished. Both the traditional courts of appeal – the lagting – and the Overhoffrett were suspended and replaced by just four Stiftoverrett – which became the new courts of appeal on the second level.106 The Supreme Court in Copenhagen remained the last instance. The central court of appeal for the Norwegian realm was now abolished. This resulted in criticism from Norway, but this soon became irrelevant as the Norwegians got their own Supreme Court in 1815. Where previously there had been four, and in the cities even five, instances, these were now reduced to three. Even more important, however, were the procedural reforms that took place alongside with the institutional ones. The appellate procedure was no longer oral but became written. This means that neither the claimant nor the defendant or the judges of the lower court levels (as it was the case before) had to appear personally before the courts of appeal. In addition, the last remnants of the layman’s participation in the Norwegian legal system finally disappeared. From now on a panel of three professional judges decided all appeal cases. These judges were very well paid and had an exceptionally high degree of education. The legislative intent was to strengthen the prestige of the appeal courts and thus the legitimacy of their rulings. Eventually, at the end of the eighteenth century, it seems that also the education of the judges in the courts of first instance was sufficient to result in the suspension of the legal duty to appeal capital criminal cases to 104 An application of the law by a body of professional judges had become an ideal in Danish legal science in the aftermath of the publication of Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois; cf. Lib. VI, chap. 6 and 7). 105 Regarding the independence of the judiciary in Norway analyzed from a historical perspective, see Holmøyvik, Eirik 2012 p. 99-126. 106 Royal Decree from 11. Aug. 1797. 305
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=