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a safe haven in the shadow of war? – mia korpiola 99 Sweden by which succession had been ultimately decided by the success of coups d’état and confirmed by fratricide (deposed Erik XIV) or exile (Sigismund). The victorious return of the deposed Polish king Sigismund with his Papists was a tangible risk which created an atmosphere of political paranoia and the unearthing of various Catholic or pro-Sigismund plots between the late 1590s and the 1620s. Sigismund’s half-brother Duke Johan of East Gothia (Östergötland, 1589 – 1618) also formed a potential threat that had been partly eliminated by his twice abjuring his rights to the crown (the succession agreements of 1604 and 1611) and marriage to his first cousin, GustavII Adolf ’s sickly sister Maria Elisabet (1596 – 1618), despite the protests of the clergy in 1612. Several important justice-related issues had been raised by the Swedish Estates of the Realm when the succession of GustavII Adolf was negotiated with them in 1611 before the king signed the accession charter. Gustav II Adolf ’s grand-father, father, and uncle JohanIII had all come to the throne as usurpers by a coup d’état and civil war, while his uncle ErikXIV and cousin Sigismund had been deposed. With these precedents in mind, the new king had a powerful incentive to demonstrate to the Estates and the people of Sweden that he addressed their legitimate grievances and provided his subjects with good policy and governance in a time of crisis. Indeed, as Barudio has pointed out, the nexus of mutual obligations (do, ut des) between the king and the Swedish people required that the people obtain law and justice in exchange for their ever growing tax burden.283 The financial crisis caused by the costs of war and the exorbitant costs of peace after his succession and especially after the ruinous peace treaty of Knäred forced the king to convene the Estates repeatedly and request their consent to extraordinary levies. The new king, his wars and peaces, threatened to pitch the realm into bankruptcy in the 1610s, and indeed, Sweden plunged into a severe economic crisis. The situation did not improve after Älvsborg had been ransomed as the king’s wars demanded continuing levies both in money and men. At the time Sweden joined the Thirty Years War in 1629, the country has been described as being in “an impoverished state” (ett utblottat skick). Its debt was 1.5 million dalers, it had almost no credit, the value of the Swedish copper daler had plummeted and tax incomes were on the decrease. In fact, at this point, even 283 Barudio, Günter 1982 p. 144.

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