the svea court of appeal in the early modern period 76 of the fact that the Ordinance of 1614, issued in February at the Diet of Örebro, insisted that there could be no legal wager, the traditional Swedish appeal, against the verdicts of the Court of Appeal. This situation was changed, it has often been asserted, by issuing the Statute on the Procedure at the Court of Appeal on 23 June 1615. For example, Sven A. Nilsson wrote that the system based on the 1614 Ordinance, an organization that was more efficient but less dependent on the king, caused doubts in the King. As evidence and as a consequence of this concern, he granted the right to appeal against the sentences of the Court to the king in the 1615 Statute. This was against the original draft by Axel Oxenstierna and may echo the above-mentioned ongoing processes at the Court of Appeal against Erik Jöransson Tegel.194 Not only do such broad generalizations and an imprecise usage of the term “appeal” give a skewed picture of the situation, but a conflict, a power struggle, between the Court and the King ending in a royal victory is also presupposed and construed. Indeed, as has been discussed above in the previous chapter, the prohibition of wagering (wadh, Swedish verb, wädhia) against the panel adjudicating in the king’s name can be found in Swedish medieval law. Thus, it is not surprising that this old tradition was upheld for the new court sitting in the king’s name both in the 1614 Ordinance and the 1615 Statute. Yet the king’s prerogative of pardon remained even after this as he was the superior of all judges in the country. Moreover, the king had the obligation as well as the right to guarantee justice to all in his realm and overturn any incorrect judgements. While the Court of Appeal was doing this in the king’s name and by his authority, this delegation of powers did not reduce the rights of the king’s person. Thus, if the king granted special and exceptional royal mercy or grace exercising his prerogative after the sentence of his judges-assignees, it did not amount to an appeal. Thus, as Stig Jägerskiöld has observed, even after the Svea Court of Appeal had been founded, the monarch “retained a latent function as the highest guarantor of justice.” Thus, the 1615 Statute need not be seen 194 Nilsson, Sven A. 1967 – 1969 p. 448: “Också G[ustav II Adolf] har här varit tveksam, vilket bl a framgår av att han redan i den 1615 utfärdade processordningen tvärtemot rättegångsordningens bestämmelser medgav appellation från hovrättens domar till kungen. De handskriftliga förhållandena antyder, att han här avvikit från Axel Oxenstiernas intentioner. Ett incitament kan ha varit den samtidigt pågående process, där hovrätten gick hårt fram mot en av Karl IX:s tidigare medhjälpare, Erik Jöransson Tegel.” See also Petrén, Sture 1964.
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