the svea court of appeal in the early modern period 72 from Sweden proper, although the Court, “our Royal Hoffrätt and our supreme Verdict” (wår Konungzlige Hoffrätt och öfwerste Doom), had been empowered to adjudicate with the King’s authority both when he was in the country and abroad (vthi wår när- som frånwaru[…] macht at döma Konungzdoma). Nevertheless, the Ordinance left it unclear how the powers of the Court were to be modified after the return of the King to Sweden and the capital.181 The law of Sweden, as the Ordinance mentioned, authorized the king to hear the petitions of the people and correct their grievances in person. Gustav II Adolf maintained that he himself wished to “always endeavour as much as possible that our loyal subjects always be protected by law and justice.” However, circumstances and the interests of the Realm prevented him from continuously dealing with judicial matters in person, which was why he founded the new Court in Stockholm so that loyal subjects would always know where they could take their grievances and “expect a just verdict.” Thus, “justice would always have its proper outcome.”182 A court case that highlighted the ambiguous powers of the Court of Appeal vis-à-vis the King was – as pointed out in literature – that of Erik Jöransson Tegel (1563 –1636), anobleman and a high-ranking former royal servant. Immediately after the first law term of the Court in the summer of 1614, dissatisfied with his loss in a property dispute and with the heavy compensation to the Crown he was liable for, Tegel took his case directly to the king. Consequently, the king wrote to the Court ordering that the execution of three of the verdicts of the Court of Appeal against Tegel in the first session were to be delayed until the return of the king to Sweden. As a result, the Court of Appeal replied to the king with as resentful a letter as the loyal and obedient royal judges-assignees could without shedding any of the necessary humility and submissiveness. In the long letter, unusually enough signed by all the judges to add authority by expressing their unanimity, the Court stressed several points. First, according to the 181 Art. 10, Rättegångs-Ordinantie Kongl. (1614), inKongl. stadgar, ed. Schmedeman, p. 137. See also Petrén, Sture 1964 p. 37. 182 Art. 10, Rättegångs-Ordinantie Kongl. (1614), inKongl. stadgar, ed. Schmedeman, p. 137: “Och ändoch wij såsom Sweriges Lagh föremäler, Allmogens Kiäremål sielff vptaga, höra och rätta wele, och oss sielfwe, så myckit mögeligit, altjid winläggia at wåre trogne Undersåtare altijdh måge widh Lagh och rättwijsa skyddade blifwa. Dock althenstund wij [...] icke altijdh sielfwe Personligen alle Rättegångs Saker kunne bijwista[...] Tå på thet Rätten må altijdh hafwa sin ordentelige framgång, och wåre trogne Undersåter were på hwad ort och ställe the sina Rättegångs Saker afläggia och rättwijs Doom förwanta skole [...].”
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